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Case No. 20100983 SC

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
Donna Whitney, individually and as parent and heir of Dillon Whitney,
deceased,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Utah Department of Juvenile Justice Services and Utah Department of
Human Services, subdivisions of the State of Utah,
Defendants/Appellants.

Defendants' Reply Brief on Certified Question of Utah Law

Defendants respectfully submit this reply brief.
I.

PLAINTIFF IGNORES THE CERTIFIED QUESTION,
BUT IT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff ignores the Immunity Act's plain language and wrongly
focuses on the Youth Corrections Act instead. Plaintiff fails to mention
this Court's Madsen IEmery test, but rests her claims on an incomplete
reading of the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in Pace v. St George City
Police Dep't, 2006 UT App. 494, 153 P.3d 789. And Plaintiff ignores the

certified question, but urges this Court to sustain the federal district
court's decision and order. Plaintiffs opening brief is not helpful. The
Court should disregard it.

A. Plaintiff ignores the Immunity Act's plain language.
Plaintiff does not analyze the incarceration exception's plain
language, that states:
Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is
not waived . . . if the injury arises out of, in
connection with, or results from . . . (j) the
incarceration of any person in any . . . other place
of legal confinement.
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(j) (emphasis added). That exception is
plain on its face and is not limited to penal institutions. It is also not
limited to persons in jail, on the way to jail, or who are situated in other
places of secure confinement. See Plaintiffs Opening Br. pp. 15-17.
But the Act applies to "each governmental entity" and to "any person"
in "any . . . other place of legal confinement." See Utah Code Ann. §
63G-7-301(5)(j).
This Court should reject Plaintiffs attempt to restrict the Act's

2

plain terms, to read new meanings into those terms, or to "place a
condition on the applicability of the [incarceration] exception without
textual justification." See Moss v. Pete Suazo Athletic Comm'n, 2007 UT
99,11 13, 175 P.3d 1042. Here, Plaintiffs injury arose out of and is
causally connected to Dillon Whitney's legal confinement to DHS's
custody, and his out-of-home placement in a DJJS-supervised proctor
home. Plaintiffs recovery for that injury is barred by the face of the
incarceration exception. Because that exception, not Utah's Youth
Corrections Act1 controls, Defendants retain their immunity from
Plaintiffs negligence claims.
B. Plaintiff ignores this Court's governing law.
This Court's prior decisions establish that a person is incarcerated
under the Immunity Act when he is "under the control of the State,"
Madsen v. State, 538 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1978), and unable to "be

1

Defendants addressed that Act's applicability at pages 15-16 of their
opening brief. The Youth Corrections Act aids, not contradicts, Defendants'
governmental immunity. Moreover, because the incarceration exception is
plain on its face - and this Court's prior decisions interpreting that exception
settled - the Court has no reason to resort to extraneous sources to aid its
statutory interpretation. See Grappendorfv. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT
84, f 9, 173 P.3d 166.
3

released [from that control] without some kind of permission." Emery v.
State, 438 P.2d 1296, 1297 (Utah 1971).2 Immunity, the Court has
stated, rests on whether the person is subject to state control, not
merely on whether he is confined to prison or a jail. See Emery, 438
P.2d at 1297.
Plaintiff does not cite that test, but she continues to focus on dicta
from the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in Pace. But that case, when
read as a whole, supports Defendants' immunity here. See Defendants'
Opening Br., pp 13-14.
Dillon Whitney was incarcerated because he engaged in unlawful
conduct. He died while in state custody and while under state control.
The juvenile court controlled Dillon Whitney's care and supervision, and
also determined where Dillon could reside. See Madsen, 538 P.2d at 93.
Dillon Whitney was not free to return home or to live with his parents,
and neither Dillon nor his parents could secure his release without

2

The Court has perpetuated that definition - without reservation since it was first announced. See Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah
1976); Kirk v. State, 784 P.2d 1255, 1257 (Utah 1989); Peck v. State, 2008 UT
39, 191 P.3d 4, 7.
4
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Whitney only possessed U ave In- visil his fnlhrr on the eve of his tragic
death becauM1 Judgr VnMiv expressly .inthorized Dillon to do so.
Plaintiff i g n o r e I hose settled facts, and argues t h a t when D J J S
placed 1 lillnii in i,"i community-based proctor home, it placed him in the
"- *

-t large." See Plaintiffs Opening Br, pp ] 5-1 3. But many

of l/ho fVi rt.s; that Plaintiff alleges in support were not plead in Plaintiffs
Amended Complaint and are not properly before the Court. 3 See
Healthcare Sews. Grp. Im\ u, Utah Dep't of Health, 2002
p.3d 591. Moreover, they are irrelevant. The incarceration exception
retains Defendant's sovereign immunity despite the alleged negligent e
He was incarcerated, in a place of legal, contmemen I "' I11Is < "<»111<
' s111»«11il
affirm the certified question,

.' • -

3

Those additional facts include Plaint n 6 aiiegaiiuau- .,.. ,-agt-s lb-18 of
her opening brief that 1) defendants permitted Dillon to go where he wanted
and do whatever he chose; 2) Dillon possessed his own .aanunnurea
entrance/exit; 3) Dillon's whereabouts were not nioniloivd at night f h<
possessed an., unlimited bus pass; and 5) defendants showed no eon. <sn v rien
they could not contact Dillon because it was exported 1 hat ho "would hi- -t in
the community."
5

II.

THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT DOES NOT
VIOLATE UTAH'S CONSTITUTION.

Utah's Immunity Act is sound and withstands Plaintiffs
complaint that as applied here, the incarceration exception (1) results in
unequal application of Utah law, see UTAH CONST, art. I § 24; (2) it
violates the open courts clause, see id., art I, § 11; and (3) the exception
contravenes Plaintiffs right to recover damages for wrongful death. See
id., art. XVI § 5. Each claim fails as a matter of law.

A.

The Incarceration Exception Will Not Result in
Unequal Application of Utah Law.

Article 1, section 24 of the Utah Constitution states "All laws of a
general nature shall have uniform operation." UTAH CONST. Art. 1, §
24. That section demands "that 'persons similarly situated should be
treated similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not be
treated as if their circumstances were the same.'" Ross v. Schackel, 920
P.2d 1159, 1167 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). Plaintiff maintains the
incarceration exception violates article I, section 24 because the
incarceration exception immunizes the State from negligence claims

6
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( VHII I, must assume (Juii holh classes of minor are the same. They are
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Foster care provides a safe haven for children who have suffered
abuse4 or nee, I net, or who are dependent through no fault of their
parent,!- ; See U t a h Code Ann. § 62A-4a-l 01(23) & generally, F'I nctor
care, or "community-based placement" on the other hand, constitutes
one of the myriad alternatives for placement of a minor in state eiisl* d,v
due his or her own, delinquent conduct. See id. at § bL,
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adjudicated as delinquent. See 78A-6-
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101 et seq. (West 2009).4 Pertinent here are Parts 3, 4 and 6 of that act.
Part 3 addresses children adjudicated by the juvenile court as abused,
neglected and dependent. See Id. at §§ 78A-6-301 to -323 ("Abuse,
Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings"). Part 4 governs delinquent
youth and states that "[t]he processes and procedures described in Part
3 . . . are not applicable to a minor who is committed to the custody of
the [Division] on a basis other than abuse or neglect and who [is]
classified in the division's management system as having been placed in
custody primarily on the basis of delinquent behavior or a status
offense." Id. § 78A-6-401 ("Minors in Custody on Grounds Other Than
Abuse or Neglect") (emphasis added). And Part 6, addresses the
juvenile court's unique jurisdiction over delinquency actions. Id. § 78A6-601 et seq. ("Delinquency and Criminal Actions.")5
4

Plaintiff does not address those statutory differences, but focuses
instead on the how youth programs become licensed. See Pla's Opening Br.
pp. 20-21. That argument misses the point. A uniform operation of law
analysis looks to whether "persons" are similarly situated, not to whether
state facilities are similarly licensed.
5

Similarly, section 78A-6-117 sets out the alternate dispositions
available to a state juvenile court judge regarding delinquent youth subject to
the court's jurisdiction. That statute also differentiates abused and neglected
children from delinquent youth. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-117(c), (d)
(West. Supp. 2010).
8

The Utah Human Services i 'ode makes similar distinctions; •
cliapler 'la caiilains I IK1 i "(nM mil Kamilv Services Act, while chapter 7
svti mil (In' ' ill li I nnvrlions AH See id. § tJ2A-4a-101and § 62A-71.

11*1 Hi HI VVhii.ney was ad indicated as delinquent and committed to
D H S \ mstoilv j„md DJJS's supervision because? he committed acts that
would have been felonies if committed by an adult. See id, § 62A-7- .-•
101(8), (30). He was adjudicated according to, and his placement
determined by the Youth Corrections Act. Dillon Whitney was a
delinquent youth, not a foster child. Granting Uetendants immuj
under those circumstances does not offend Utah s constitution.
B.
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and procedural rights, but it "is not an absolute guarantee of all
substantive rights." Tindley v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist, 2005 UT 30, f
17, 116 P.3d 295, 300. The clause does not guarantee Plaintiffs claims
here.
A statute violates the open courts clause if it abrogates a right or
remedy in existence at the time of its enactment. See Berry, 111 P.2d
at 680; see also Tindley, 2005 UT 30, \ 17; Laney v. Fairview City, 2002
UT 79, f 50, 57 P.3d 1007, 1021-23. Accordingly, the legislature stands
"free to abrogate or limit claims that could not have been brought under
then-existing law. Claims barred by the doctrine of governmental
immunity are an example of this principle." Tindley, 2005 UT 30, f 17;
see also Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 620 (Utah 1983) ("Article I, §
11 worked no change in the principle of sovereign immunity, and
sovereign immunity is not unconstitutional under that section.")6

6

This Court has consistently upheld the Immunity Act in the face of an
open courts challenge. See Moss v. Pete Suazo Utah Athletic Comm'n, 2007
UT 99, 175 P.3d 1042 (barring wrongful death action by heir to professional
boxer under permit exception); Tindley, 2005 UT 30 (upholding Immunity
Act's damages cap); Ross, 920 P.2d at 1162-1163 (Utah 1996) (barring inmate
suit against prison doctor under incarceration exception and second Berry
prong); but see Day u. Utah Dep't of Pub. Safety, 980 P.2d 1171, 1183-1187
(Utah 1999) (finding open courts clause violation where statute failed to meet
10

The Utah Legislature first adopted the Immunity Act, including
the incarceration exception, in 1965. Prior to that time, government
entities "were afforded immunity to the extent that their activities
qualified as government functions." Tindley, 2005 UT 30, f 20 (citation
omitted). Under the common law, there was no right to sue the State.
See Tiede v. State, 915 P.2d 500, 503-504 (Utah 1996).
Plaintiff agrees that committing a delinquent minor to state
custody constitutes a government function. See Pla's Opening Br., p.
11. And she must concede this Court's holding in Tiede. To determine,
therefore, whether the incarceration exception violates the open courts
clause, the Court need only decide whether Plaintiff would have
possessed a right to bring her claims prior to 1965. Plaintiff has
pointed to no such authority and Defendants have searched, but have
found none.
Instead, Plaintiff contends that because in 1983, this Court
recognized a cause of action against the Division of Child and Family
Services (DCFS) for negligent placement of a foster child, the Court also

Berry test).
11

recognized a cause of action for negligent placement of all children in
state's custody. Pla's Opening Br. p. 23 (citing Little v. Utah Div. of
Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983)). But Little does not support
the inference that Plaintiff urges.
First, by the time Little was decided in 1983, this Court had
already recognized that the State retained immunity for an injury that
"'(10) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison,
county or city jail, or other place of legal confinement. ..'" Emery v.
State, 483 P.2d 1296 (Utah 1971) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-3010(10) (1965)). Moreover, in Little, the Court considered only whether
the discretionary function exception barred the plaintiffs' claim against
DCFS for negligent placement of a foster child. See Little, 667 P.2d at
50-51. Here, the Court must examine whether these Defendants DHS and DJJS - retain immunity under the incarceration exception for
actions related to Dillon Whitney's delinquent placement. Little neither
addressed nor contemplated those claims. That decision is inapposite.
Plaintiff has not shown that prior to 1965 she possessed the right
to sue Defendants under similar facts. Therefore, retaining Defendants
immunity here neither limits nor abrogates a prior right of action.
12

Absent such abrogation, the Court should reject Plaintiffs alternate
claim.

C.

The Incarceration Exception Does Not Violate
the Right to Recover Damages for Wrongful
Death.

The incarceration exception also does not violate the right to
recover damages for wrongful death provided by article XVT, section 5 of
the Utah Constitution. That section states, in part:
[t]he right to recover for injuries resulting in
death, shall never be abrogated, and the amount
recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory
limitation.. .
UTAH CONST, art. XVI, § 5.

Nearly 100 years ago, the Court stated "the Constitution clearly
prohibits the Legislature from abrogating" the wrongful death right of
action. See Garfield Smelting Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 53 Utah 133,
138-39, 178 P. 57, 59 (1918). There, the Court observed that to
determine whether that right has been abrogated, it is '"necessary to
inquire what th[e] right was and who enjoyed it at the time the
Constitution was adopted . . . . hence the right referred to must be

13

deemed to be the right as it then existed and not merely an abstract
rights

Tiede, 915 P.2d at 504 (quoting Garfield, 53 Utah at 138-39, 178

P. at 59 (emphasis added in Tiede)).
At the time Utah adopted its constitution, "[sovereign immunity
was a settled feature of the common law." Id. at 504. And since 1986,
this Court has held that at common law, there was no right to sue the
State for wrongful death. Id. The Court has not strayed from that
conclusion, or from its belief that "by retaining governmental immunity
from wrongful death suits against the State [the Immunity Act] does
not abrogate any previously existing right of action and therefore does
not violate article XVI, section 5." Id; see Tindley, 2005 UT 30, f 36;
Parks v. Utah Transit Auth., 2002 UT 55, \ 15, 53 P.3d 473.
Plaintiff acknowledges this authority and also the Court's
reasoning, but she claims it is wrong. A party seeking to overturn
precedent assumes the "substantial burden" to convince the Court that
the standard "was clearly erroneous or conditions have changed so as to
render the prior decision inapplicable." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393,
399 & n.3 (Utah 1994); see Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, f 45, 57

14

P.3d 1007. Plaintiff has not carried that burden.
Plaintiff maintains that when this Court first decided Tiede - and
thereafter - it acted without the benefit of history. That case was
wrongly decided, Plaintiff contends, because by the time Utah enacted
its constitution in 1895, its territorial government had adopted Lord
Campbell's Act, which stated:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused
by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act,
neglect or default is such as would, if the death
had not ensured, have entitled the party injured
to maintain an action and recover damages in
respect thereof, then, an in every such case, the
person who, or the company or corporation which
would have been liable if death had not ensued
shall be liable to an action for damages,
notwithstanding the death of the person injured,
and although the death shall have been caused
under such circumstances as amount to law to
felony.
Comp. Laws Territory of Utah 1987; 2 Comp. 1888 § 2961 (emphasis
added).
Lord Campbell's Act bound a person, a company, or a corporation
responsible for wrongful death. It said nothing about the state, its
employees, or any other governmental entity. That Act, therefore,

15

governed private rights of action, not claims against the state.
The Court correctly decided Tiede. That case governs Plaintiffs
claims. This Court should reject Plaintiffs converse argument.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing, Defendants urge the Court to affirm the
certified question and to disregard Plaintiffs alternative state
constitutional claims.
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of July, 2011.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

BRIDOET K: ROMANO
Utah Solicitor General
Attorneys for State Defendants
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